Verify a Vendor's Bank-Change Request Before You Pay It
Seattle AP teams should verify a vendor's bank change by calling a number already on file. Washington law lets the receiving bank pay by account number alone.
In this guide
When a vendor emails a Seattle accounts payable team to say its bank account has changed, the safe answer does not depend on how convincing the email looks: do not change the banking details on file or release a payment to a new account until you have verified the request out of band. Call the vendor back on a phone number you already hold from a prior invoice or the contract, never a number, email or link supplied in the request itself, confirm the change with a person you can identify, and have a second person approve it before any payment uses the new account. Everything else in this article supports that callback; nothing replaces it.
The request usually looks routine: a remittance form, the right logo, a sender you have emailed before. It may exist only to redirect your next payment into a criminal's account, and under Washington's funds transfer law the receiving bank need not check that the account number matches the vendor's name.
This differs from the fraud scoring a bank runs, covered in why Washington banks still lose money despite AI fraud detection, and is narrower than what to automate first in accounts payable. The target is one event, a change to where a supplier's money goes, and the control is a verification procedure, not a model.
See how a finance-operations engagement maps payment controls onto your AP and ERP.
Why this fraud lands in accounts payable now
Business email compromise (BEC) is the umbrella for scams that use a compromised or spoofed email account to redirect a legitimate payment. The FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center puts the global exposed dollar loss from BEC at about $55.5 billion between October 2013 and December 2023, and its public alert tells organizations to "use secondary channels and/or two-factor authentication to verify requests for changes in account information," in its alert on business email compromise. Exposed loss combines attempted and actual fraud and is cumulative and global, not one year's realized loss, but the mechanism it describes is exactly the vendor bank-change request.
The teams that see these attempts most are treasury and AP. The Association for Financial Professionals, in its 2025 Payments Fraud and Control Survey, reported that BEC was the most common method behind attempted or actual payments fraud in 2024, that 60% of practitioners saw an increase in vendor impersonation specifically, and that wire transfers were the primary payment target, in its briefing for treasury professionals. The survey is self-reported and skews toward larger organizations, but the shift it names, from impersonating an executive to impersonating a supplier, is what moves the risk onto the AP desk.
Why a Washington bank will not catch the mismatch for you
A fraudulent change usually keeps the vendor's name on the payment and swaps only the account number. For a wire or other funds transfer covered by Washington's version of UCC Article 4A, the receiving bank may rely on the number: if a payment order names one person and carries another person's account number, and that bank does not know they differ, it may treat the number as the proper identification of the beneficiary and need not determine whether the name and number refer to the same person (RCW 62A.4A-207). If your own bank proves you had notice before the payment that it might be made on the number alone, and a signed record stating that is enough, you remain obliged to pay the order, and getting the money back from whoever received it falls to the law of mistake and restitution. Ask your bank what your funds transfer agreement says, but plan as if the name will not save the payment: the check has to happen before the vendor master changes.
Washington's own payee system shows the hold in practice. The Office of Financial Management says it verifies a supplier's direct deposit account with the bank before paying into it, which usually takes about seven business days, and pays by check to the address on file in the meantime. That is the failed-callback branch below in another form.
The verification procedure competitors skip past
Most published guidance agrees on the core control. The Government Finance Officers Association, in its guidance on electronic vendor fraud, tells organizations to confirm payment-information changes by telephone to a known number rather than by email, to require both the old and the new account details on any change request, and to separate the person who enters a vendor change from the person who approves it. What most guides leave out is what happens when the callback does not cleanly confirm, and how to keep a legitimate supplier from waiting a week. The procedure below fills those gaps. It is a control method, not a guarantee that fraud cannot occur.
| Step | Who owns it | What it produces |
|---|---|---|
| Freeze on receipt: any bank-detail change moves the vendor to a pending-verification state and blocks payment to the new account. | AP clerk who receives the request | A held change; no payment can be scheduled to the new details. |
| Call back on a number already on file, from a prior invoice or the contract, not one in the request. | AP clerk, using the vendor master | A recorded call: number dialed, person reached, what they confirmed, date and time. |
| If the callback confirms, a second person who did not enter the change approves it. | AP supervisor or controller | A dual-approved change with both old and new details on record. |
| If the callback fails (no answer, an unknown contact, or the vendor cannot confirm), keep paying only to the previously verified account and open an escalation; do not release to the new one. | AP supervisor | A held payment and a documented reason; no funds move to an unverified account. |
| Confirm back to the vendor's known-good email and prior contact that the banking on file was changed. | AP clerk | A notice that lets a real vendor say they did not request it, catching account takeover. |
Two branches matter most and are usually missing. The first is the failed callback. When you cannot reach a known contact, the correct action is to do nothing to the account on file and continue any due payments to the previously verified details, because a fraudulent request loses its value the moment it cannot redirect money. The second is urgency. A message that presses for same-day payment before an account supposedly closes is applying the exact pressure the FBI describes; treat urgency as a reason to slow down, and give the AP team a named person, usually the controller, who can authorize an exception only after a live verification, never as a way around it.
A worked example
The following example is illustrative; the vendor, contacts, and amounts are assumptions, not a client case. Northaven Mechanical is a facilities contractor you pay by ACH. On a Tuesday an email arrives from Northaven's usual billing address: their bank has changed, please route Friday's $84,200 progress payment to a new account, and a completed change form is attached. The AP clerk freezes the change and pulls the phone number from the signed contract on file, not the number in the email signature, which differs by two digits. The contract number reaches Northaven's office manager, who has no record of any banking change and confirms the current account is unchanged. The clerk holds the change, leaves Friday's payment routed to the verified account, and forwards the email to the controller. Northaven's own IT later finds the billing mailbox had been accessed by an outsider. Nothing was lost, and the only reason is that the verification used a number the fraudster did not control.
Weigh that against the cost of the control. Suppose a mid-size AP team processes roughly 40 vendor-master changes a month, and past experience says about 5% of them are bank-detail changes: that is 40 × 5% = 2 callbacks a month, a few minutes each. Two short phone calls is the price of not sending $84,200 to a stranger. The workload is small precisely because bank-detail changes are rare, and that rarity is also why a busy clerk can be tempted to wave one through.
Where automation helps, and where a person must decide
Software earns its place on the enforcement and detection side of this control, not the judgment side.
| Automation does this well | A person still owns this |
|---|---|
| Force every bank-detail change into a pending state and block payment to new details until an approval is recorded. | Making the out-of-band call to a number known to be the vendor's, and judging whether the person is who they claim. |
| Flag the risky pattern: a new account, the first payment to changed details, a mismatch with the vendor master, or foreign routing on a domestic vendor. | Deciding whether a flagged change is a legitimate banking move or an attack, which turns on the callback, not the flag. |
| Keep the audit trail (who requested, who verified, which number, who approved) without relying on memory. | Handling the failed callback and the urgent-payment exception through the escalation path. |
No product prevents BEC on its own; it enforces the workflow and surfaces signals. A system that lets the same person enter and approve a change, or that treats its own pending flag as if it were verification, gives false comfort. Even the AP-automation platforms that market a callback feature say as much when they add that you should still confirm independently through a trusted channel.
What to measure, and what makes it fail
Track a few numbers that show the control is running, not just installed: the share of bank-detail changes verified by callback before the first payment to the new account, the time from request to approved change, and the count and age of held changes. Keep these apart from any fraud-loss figure; zero losses in a quarter only shows that no attempt got through. A pilot fails in predictable ways, such as one person entering and approving changes, a callback to the number in the request, or urgency used to skip verification, and each is a process choice, not a software gap.
Quick answers
How do you verify a vendor's bank account change?
Freeze the change, call the vendor back on a number you already hold from a prior invoice or the contract, never one supplied in the request, confirm with a person you can identify, and have a second person approve it before any payment uses the new account.
What should AP do if the verification callback fails?
Leave the banking on file unchanged, keep paying only to the previously verified account and open an escalation. A fraudulent request loses its value the moment it cannot redirect money.
Will the bank stop a payment if the account number does not match the vendor's name?
Do not count on it. Under RCW 62A.4A-207, a Washington receiving bank that does not know the name and number differ may rely on the number without checking, so verify before updating the vendor master.
Can software prevent vendor payment fraud?
Not on its own. Software can force every bank-detail change into a pending state, flag risky patterns and keep the audit trail; a person still places the callback and judges the answer.
Sources
- its alert on business email compromise · ic3.gov
- its briefing for treasury professionals · financialprofessionals.org
- RCW 62A.4A-207 · app.leg.wa.gov
- Office of Financial Management · ofm.wa.gov
- its guidance on electronic vendor fraud · gfoa.org
Revision note · October 6, 2026: Headline simplified; the article body is unchanged.
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